[blackshoe]

iviehoff, on 2014-March-04, 04:35, said:

I think we are trying our hardest to demonstrate that there are no loopholes for cheats to take advantage of, which requires an exploration of what potential loopholes can exist. Lamford has had to add extra fortuitous facts indicating how difficult it is to use this course of action for cheating. The wording of Law 23 makes it very difficult for a mode of cheating to exist. If a route is useful to cheats, then the "could well have known" test surely applies. In the present case, the difficulty is the counterfactual for adjustment. Counterfactuals for adjustment tend to be obscure when the action giving rise to adjustment is the first action in the auction. Maybe that should be a reason for making an artificial adjustment on this occasion.

Okay, that's fair enough. And Law 12C1{d} gives us the authority for an artificial adjustment here ("possibilities are numerous or not obvious").

[aguahombre]

Contrary to misquotes here, L23 simply uses "could have known" in the part related to possible intention of the offender. Then, later "could well damage" is used as an adverb to "damage".

Well seems to mean "successfully" (per Webster) in that context, and does not require any burden above speculation that the offender might have known that his action would be successful in damaging the opponents.

If Law23 really said "could well have known", then Lamford's "more likely than not" would be the burden we must show. It doesn't say that.

[gnasher]

aguahombre, on 2014-March-04, 10:24, said:

Well seems to mean "successfully" (per Webster) in that context, and does not require any burden above speculation that the offender might have known that his action would be successful in damaging the opponents.

In English English "could well" implies a greater probability than merely "could".

[aguahombre]

gnasher, on 2014-March-04, 11:48, said:

In English English "could well" implies a greater probability than merely "could".

That is fine. But, it is not "could well have known". It is "could well damage". So, it doesn't apply in L23 to our assessment of the offender's intent at the time of the offense.

If we raise the bar from possibility to probability by interpreting L23 differently than the way it is written, the Probst cheat wins.

The beauty of L23, IMO, is that it can be applied without accusing. If we only get to use it when we can say the offender probably had something evil in mind, we are accusing and can use a different Law.

This post has been edited by aguahombre: 2014-March-04, 12:34

[blackshoe]

Quote

Whenever, in the opinion of the Director, an offender could have been aware at the time of his irregularity that this could well damage the non-offending side, the Director shall require the auction and play to continue (if not completed). When the play has been completed, the Director awards an adjusted score if he considers the offending side has gained an advantage through the irregularity*.

* As, for example, by partner’s enforced pass.

Couple of things. "In the opinion of the director". This gives no guidance as to what should inform the director's opinion. We are thus dangerously close to the "whim" against which Nigel so often warns us. Perhaps a discussion of this area would prove useful to the readers of this forum (both players and directors), but IMO that should be the subject of a separate thread. "Could have been aware" and "could well damage". If there's only a small probability of damage, less than "could well", then whether the player could have been aware of that is irrelevant - Law 23 does not apply. So perhaps to start we should look at whether the action could well damage the NOS. Lastly, "when the play has been completed…" The implication of this is that in a case where Law 23 might apply, you don't need to look at that question until, after the play, you decide that "the offending side has gained an advantage through the irregularity". Note that "gained an advantage" is not the same thing as "the NOS were damaged".

IMO this is one of the more difficult laws in the book.

[Zelandakh]

Did anyone else read agua's post and imagine Sacha Baron Cohen saying something like "That could well damage him, man!" meaning hurt him badly? Yes the term is potentially ambiguous but the normal reading of it as I understand it is to strengthen the requirement - could damage would be any chance no matter how small; could well damage means a reasonable chance of damage, although just where this line is to be drawn should really be defined somewhere.

[pran]

Zelandakh, on 2014-March-05, 07:03, said:

Did anyone else read agua's post and imagine Sacha Baron Cohen saying something like "That could well damage him, man!" meaning hurt him badly? Yes the term is potentially ambiguous but the normal reading of it as I understand it is to strengthen the requirement - could damage would be any chance no matter how small; could well damage means a reasonable chance of damage, although just where this line is to be drawn should really be defined somewhere.

That is pecisely the point: "well" strengthens the probability from "anything possible" to "some significant probability, but not neccessarily even approaching 50%".

Exactly where the line is drawn is up to judgement by the director in each case.

[barmar]

blackshoe, on 2014-March-04, 16:31, said:

Couple of things. "In the opinion of the director". This gives no guidance as to what should inform the director's opinion. We are thus dangerously close to the "whim" against which Nigel so often warns us.

Do you really think there can be an objective criteria for determining what someone "could have known", and that could apply in all (or even most) situations where the director has to determine this?

[aguahombre]

pran, on 2014-March-05, 07:14, said:

That is pecisely the point: "well" strengthens the probability from "anything possible" to "some significant probability, but not neccessarily even approaching 50%".

Exactly where the line is drawn is up to judgement by the director in each case.

"Well" does something to add to the verb "damage", which is ideed used in a verb form in Law 23, but adds no probability to what the offender could have known. Even Sacha would probably be applying his adverbs to the verbs nearest.

[blackshoe]

barmar, on 2014-March-05, 09:55, said:

Do you really think there can be an objective criteria for determining what someone "could have known", and that could apply in all (or even most) situations where the director has to determine this?

Of course not. I do believe that directors could do with some guidance as to how to apply this law. Particularly club level directors in the ACBL.

[pran]

pran, on 2014-March-05, 07:14, said:

That is pecisely the point: "well" strengthens the probability from "anything possible" to "some significant probability, but not neccessarily even approaching 50%".

Exactly where the line is drawn is up to judgement by the director in each case.

aguahombre, on 2014-March-05, 12:24, said:

"Well" does something to add to the verb "damage", which is ideed used in a verb form in Law 23, but adds no probability to what the offender could have known. Even Sacha would probably be applying his adverbs to the verbs nearest.

"could" happen: There is a possibility (however small but greater than zero) that something happens.

"could well" happen: There is a significant possibility (for instance at least 10% or maybe 20%) that something happens.

"will most likely" happen: There is an almost certainty that something happens.

The word "well" applies to "could", not to "happens"

[aguahombre]

Yep, but it doesn't apply to the offender's knowledge of the probability that something would happen at the moment he committed the infraction. Law 23 does.

I probably/likely could have predicted an outcome.
I could have predicted a probable/likely outcome.

These are different statements. The first one says it is more likely than not I figured what would happen. The second says the outcome was likely, but my ability to predict it is in question.

Law 23 only requires the second. We know this because that is what Law 23 says.

[pran]

aguahombre, on 2014-March-05, 15:24, said:

Yep, but it doesn't apply to the offender's knowledge of the probability that something would happen at the moment he committed the infraction. Law 23 does.

I probably/likely could have predicted an outcome.
I could have predicted a probable/likely outcome.

These are different statements. The first one says it is more likely than not I figured what would happen. The second says the outcome was likely, but my ability to predict it is in question.

Law 23 only requires the second. We know this because that is what Law 23 says.

Honestly I don't understand Your point?

What Law 23 says is that if I at the time I committed an irregularity could with some significant (although not neccessarily very high) probability have predicted that my irregularity might result in damage to opponents (without neccessarily knowing in what way!) then there is cause for adjustment if my opponents really became damaged from my irregularity.

There is no requirement that I shall be aware of the possible damaging outcome from my irregularity.

[barmar]

Almost anything "could" be true. Could the framers really have intended such a low bar in Law 23.

[barmar]

barmar, on 2014-March-06, 10:31, said:

Almost anything "could" be true. Could the framers really have intended such a low bar in Law 23.

Hmm, I worded that question poorly. I used "could" in my question, and as I said, almost anything could be true, so I guess the question answers itself.

Is it likely the framers intended...?

[pran]

As I have already stated:

pran, on 2014-March-05, 07:14, said:

That is pecisely the point: "well" strengthens the probability from "anything possible" to "some significant probability, but not neccessarily even approaching 50%".

Exactly where the line is drawn is up to judgement by the director in each case.

barmar, on 2014-March-06, 10:33, said:

Hmm, I worded that question poorly. I used "could" in my question, and as I said, almost anything could be true, so I guess the question answers itself.

Is it likely the framers intended...?

And I assume that is exactly what is intended.

[nige1]

blackshoe, on 2014-March-03, 10:08, said:

Are we seriously having a discussion about how best to cheat?

I hope not. Law 23 has no requirement that the player acted deliberately, was aware of what he'd done, knew his irregularity might harm opponents, or how it might do so. For law 23 to apply, it's sufficient that the irregularity could cause damage and there's a significant possibility that the offender "could have known" that.

Corrected and expanded

This post has been edited by nige1: 2014-March-06, 15:26

[aguahombre]

pran, on 2014-March-05, 17:29, said:

What Law 23 says is that if I at the time I committed an irregularity could with some significant (although not neccessarily very high) probability have predicted that my irregularity might result in damage to opponents (without neccessarily knowing in what way!) then there is cause for adjustment if my opponents really became damaged from my irregularity.

nige1, on 2014-March-06, 12:12, said:

I hope not. Law 23 has no requirement that a player knew that his irregularity might harm opponents or how it might do so. For law 23 to apply, it's sufficient that there was at least a small but significant likelihood of damage, which the offender "could have known" about.

I have failed to communicate that these two readings of Law 23 are different, and that Nige1's reading is what the Law actually says.

[lamford]

nige1, on 2014-March-06, 12:12, said:

For law 23 to apply, it's sufficient that there was at least a small but significant likelihood of damage

No. If that were the case, they would have left out the word "well", which, as gnasher points out, implies a higher probability. The long-suffering TD has to assign a probability to this "well", as he has to do with the "some" in Law 16.

http://bridge.rfrick...s/couldwell.htm has an interesting discussion of the meaning of "could well". I think that this is the right interpretation:

There should be a rectification when the player, at the time of the infraction, could have calculated that committing the irregularity and paying the proscribed penalty had a higher expected value than not committing the irregularity.

[blackshoe]

lamford, on 2014-March-06, 13:17, said:

There should be a rectification when the player, at the time of the infraction, could have calculated that committing the irregularity and paying the proscribed penalty had a higher expected value than not committing the irregularity.

It seems to me that makes rectification under Law 23 very rare. Mind you, I'm not saying he's wrong.