These numbers are not adding up for me. As to the 35 versus 50, I would have expected that to be from the same reason bonds generally do not trade at face value: a. You have to wait for maturity to get the face value and b. you may not get it.
But a bond that would pay 50 in thirty years would not be trading at 35 or anything near it even if there was great confidence in the payout, which there isn't.
Ok, so I do not need to understand those details since I have no plans to buy them. In regard to who takes the hit (3.7B of it anyway), I found the following:
http://technorati.co...sovereign-debt/
Quote
A new debt deal struck between private lenders and European leaders Thursday effectively eliminated the possibility of a Greek default. Banks involved in the negotiations agreed to 'voluntarily' reduce the value of the Greek debt they hold by 50%. According to Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, the deal makes Greece's debt load manageable, but, according to many, it may have disastrous implications for the sovereign debt market.
The problem is that because "the terms governing credit-default swaps on European sovereign bonds imply that a voluntary debt restructuring won't trigger payouts to buyers of protection," those who smartly hedged their investments in Greek sovereign debt by purchasing credit-default swaps will not receive the payments to which they are entitled.
Let's face it, Greece defaulted. However you want to spin the new debt deal, Greece was headed for bankruptcy and the 'voluntary' haircut banks agreed to take on their Greek debt was the result of relentless pressure from German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Nicolas Sarkozy. In other words, it wasn't really voluntary. Surely Greece's debtors did not really want to write-down their holdings--no one jumps at the opportunity to take a loss.
On the bright side, the new agreement allowed Europe to side-step a so-called 'credit event' in which a Greek default would have triggered CDS payments and which would theoretically have caused Italy and Spain's borrowing costs to skyrocket. However, the new deal costs CDS holders a total of $3.7 billion in payments they would have received had Greece's default not been classified as a 'voluntary restructuring'. This will likely shake investor's confidence in the reliability of the CDS market.
While many observers would welcome the demise of the credit-default swap (the instrument is widely blamed for much of the damage done during the financial crisis), maintaining CDS credibility is critical for the functioning of the sovereign debt market. If investors believe government intervention will prevent them from receiving payments on credit-default swaps, they may simply choose to avoid buying sovereign debt altogether. In other words, if banks cannot buy reliable protection to insure them against losses on the debt they purchase, they may not purchase the debt in the first place. Worse still, banks may simply dump their holdings of European sovereign debt if they become convinced that government intervention will always negate their CDS payouts by classifying any bankruptcy as a 'voluntary restructuring'.
The debt deal struck by European leaders may have accomplished exactly what it set out to prevent. Instead of propping-up the sovereign debt market, they may have seriously undermined it.
I understand events in mathematics pretty well because I am a mathematician, and it does not surprise me that non-mathematicians have a tough time making sense of the advanced aspects of it. By analogy, it does not amaze me when I find these financial matters to be over my head. As I do here. But I can see how we might hold off on the champagne for a bit. Nonetheless, there was a very real loss and someone had to take the hit (aka the transfer).